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Introduction
The year 2009 has been a year of numerous commemora-
tions of both scientific and non-scientific achievements that
contributed to the advancement of human kind. Protestants
celebrated the 500th anniversary of the birth of Calvin;
literary critics celebrated the 200th anniversary of the poet
Edgar Allan Poe; and the musical genius Felix Mendels-
sohn-Bartholdy was also born 200 years ago. 2009 further
marked the bicentennial of the birth of Louis Braille, the
inventor of Braille; and Abraham Lincoln, the 16th presi-
dent of the United States, who founded the National
Academy of Sciences. Pierre Curie, famous for his work on
radioactivity that he conducted together with his wife
Marie Curie, was born 150 ago; as was John Dewey, a
philosopher and psychologist who is recognized as one of
the founding fathers of both pragmatism as well as func-
tional psychology.
UNESCO and the International Astronomical Union
dubbed 2009 the International Year of Astronomy
(IYA2009, http://www.astronomy2009.org/). By doing so,
astronomers celebrated the 400th anniversary of Galileo
Galilei’s telescopic observations as well as the publication
of Johannes Kepler’s Astronomia nova wherein he formu-
lated the first two laws of planetary motion. 2009 also
marked the last of a 3-year-long celebration of Planet Earth
http://www.yearofplanetearth.org/, another UNESCO-gov-
erned initiative.
However, for evolutionary biologists and philosophers
of science, 2009 will be largely remembered for its
worldwide commemorations of the 200th anniversary of
the birth of Charles Darwin, and the 150th anniversary of
the publication of his magnum opus On the origin of spe-
cies by means of natural selection.1 In order to pay tribute
to Darwin’s major contribution to the advancement of
evolutionary science, the International Union of Biological
Sciences and the International Union of History and Phi-
losophy of Science have called the year 2009 the Darwin
Year http://darwin-year-2009.org/index.html.
Given that so many scientific discoveries were com-
memorated, COPUS, the Coalition on the Public Under-
standing on Science, called out 2009 as the Year of Science
http://www.yearofscience2009.org/home/, in the hope to
pay equal tribute to both the field of biology as well as
astronomy.
2009 was indeed a year of biology. Somewhat over-
shadowed by the big Darwin celebrations, smaller-scaled
events were held to commemorate the 200th anniversary of
the publication of Lamarck’s Philosophie Zoologique; and
the 150th anniversary of the death of Alexander von
Humboldt, the father of biogeography. In 1910, Constantin
Mereschkowsky wrote his article on symbiogenesis entitled
‘The Theory of Two Plasmas as the Basis of Symbiogen-
esis, a New Study for the Origins of Organisms’. The
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article was published in the German Biologisches Zen-
tralblatt, the journal that would later evolve into the current
Theory in Biosciences. Somewhat forgotten, but equally
important for the field of symbiogenesis, was the 200th
anniversary of the birth of Pierre-Joseph Van Beneden, a
Belgian paleontologist and zoologist famous for distin-
guishing parasitism from commensalism. Finally, Henry
Bergson, known for inventing the currently rejected notion
of élan vital, was born 150 years ago.
In order to memorialize the important role these biolo-
gists played in the advancement of our understanding of the
evolutionary process, a 2-day international conference was
organized entitled: Evolution today and tomorrow, Darwin
evaluated by contemporary evolutionary and philosophical
theories http://cfcul.fc.ul.pt/coloquios/darwincolloquium/
coloquiodarwin.htm. The conference was organized by
The Centre for Philosophy of Science of the University of
Lisbon (Portugal), in collaboration with the Centre for
Environmental Biology of the same university, and the
Lisbon Centre for Applied Psychology.
The articles presented here are a spin-off of this con-
ference. The current volumes contain the peer-reviewed
articles of a selection of the plenary and invited speakers,
as well as those of scholars who were additionally invited
to contribute to the volumes.
Contrary to most of the 2009 Darwin conferences,
Evolution today and tomorrow did not exclusively focus on
the impact that Darwin’s theory of natural selection had on
modern evolutionary biology and philosophy of biology.
Rather, natural selection was examined in relation to the
theories of symbiogenesis and punctuated equilibria.
Emphasis was put on the controversies over the pace of
evolution, the different species concepts that are associated
with different evolutionary theories, and the units and
levels of evolution debate. The articles that grew out of
these debates are bundled in Part A of this double issue.
The conference additionally focussed on the current
implementation of Neodarwinian thinking in the human
and social sciences. The philosophical implications of this
implementation were also the topic of investigation. The
resulting articles make up Part B.
Setting the stage
It is more than thirty years [for us it is 150 years]
since the Origin of Species was written, but for many
these questions are in no sense answered yet. In
owing that it is so, we shall not honour Darwin’s
memory the less: for whatever may be the part which
shall be finally assigned to Natural Selection, it will
always be remembered that it was through Darwin’s
work that men saw for the first time that the problem
is one which man may reasonably hope to solve. If
Darwin did not solve the problem himself, he first
gave us the hope of a solution, perhaps a greater
thing. How great a feat this was, we who have heard
it all from childhood can scarcely know. (Bateson,
cited in Schwartz 1999, p. 196)
As is well known, Darwin developed his ideas on evo-
lution after a 5-year-long travel around the world on Her
Majesty’s Ship Beagle. During this journey, Darwin was
greatly struck by the enormous morphological variation
there exists within and between species, which at times
made it difficult for him to distinguish between mere
variations of the same species, and different species alto-
gether. At the same time, he was also astonished by the
great affinity in features, which sometimes exists between
different species, and within members of the same species
(Burrow 1972).
These morphological features can be either beneficial or
detrimental for those organisms, depending on how well
they help organisms to obtain environmental resources
such as food. Resources tend to be limited, and features can
either help or disable an organism in its ‘struggle for
existence’.
Furthermore, Darwin (1859) was convinced that the
variation displayed was hereditary, and that heritable traits
were transmitted during reproduction.
It follows that organisms can only transmit their heritable
features to the next generation when they are able to survive
long enough to reproduce. Organisms that are disabled in
their features, and that are subsequently unable to make it in
the struggle for existence, die out without being able to
reproduce, or they reproduce less often than others. In other
words, they are not favoured by the environment. It follows
that maladapted organisms are naturally weeded out, while
adaptive organisms, i.e. organisms that are able to survive
long enough in the environment to reproduce, are naturally
‘preserved’. The subtitle of Darwin’s Origin talks about The
preservation of favoured races in the struggle for existence,
which is just another way of stating that adapted organisms
are naturally selected by the environment wherein a struggle
for resources takes place.
As a consequence, organisms appear to be a perfect fit
for their environment, and adaptation can be measured by
the number of successful descendents (called fitness).
Because adaptive traits get naturally selected, and mal-
adaptive traits die out, the variational traits get reshuffled
over subsequent generations, resulting in descent with
modification. In the long run, this modification can become
so enormous that the gap with the parental species has
become sufficiently wide to recognize the descendents as
part of a new species. Furthermore, maladaptation can lead
to extinction. Thus species are neither morphologically
78 Theory Biosci. (2010) 129:77–87
123
fixed nor unchangeable, rather they evolve into new species
or ‘transmutate’ as Darwin called it, or they die out.
This, in a nutshell, is the great contribution Darwin
made to the advancement of biological science.
Simple as these ideas may seem at first sight, they are far
from it. The last 150 years have been characterized by
vigorous scientific debate and intensive research into how
exactly we have to test and interpret these great ideas of
adaptation, struggle for existence, natural selection, descent
with modification and transmutation of species.
Darwin’s biggest stumbling block was how variation
occurred. He wrote at a time that genes had yet to be
discovered, and he had no idea how information could be
passed on to future generations. In order to explain the
transmission of existing features, and to explain the origin
of novel features, he invoked ideas such as the blending of
gemulles (which were presumed hereditary particles),
pangenesis, and Lamarck’s ideas of use and disuse and the
inheritance of acquired characteristics. He further assumed,
partly because he endorsed the idea that hereditary traits
could blend, that evolution was a slow and gradual process
and that therefore, numerous intermediates lined up
between species. However, the fossil record could not help
in verifying this idea, because no such intermediates were
found. Rather, different species appeared to arise rather
abruptly in the fossil record.
In the years to follow, different research fields origi-
nated that were put to use to test and prove the theory of
evolution by means of natural selection. As a result, dif-
ferent elements of Darwin’s original formulation of the
theory were reformulated or abandoned (such as the ideas
of blending or Lamarckian inheritance), and new elements
were added to the theory. In the 1930s, the Modern Syn-
thesis was formed, which provided scholars with the
standard paradigm of how evolution by means of natural
selection occurred. Neodarwinians, as the founders of the
synthesis are called, combined Mendelian hereditary laws
with modern genetics and de Vries’ mutation theory. With
the Modern Synthesis, evolutionary biology was also
mathematized and an interest was developed in population
biology. Today, the evidence for the occurrence of evolu-
tion is now so abundant that we can say that evolution is a
fact of nature. And that evolution occurs by means of
natural selection is abundantly clear. Nonetheless, debate
continues over what exactly it means for something to
evolve by means of natural selection.
Evolution by means of natural selection,
a meta-theoretical analysis
In its modern Neodarwinian version, evolution by means of
natural selection has come to imply that small, genetic
variations that are phenotypically displayed by organisms,
and that are caused by chromosomal rearrangements and
random mutations, are positively selected for in relation to
the environment when adaptive. Over time, the natural
selection of favourable traits gradually leads to the diver-
sification from the original species up to the point that a
new species evolves.
However, what does this mean exactly? What assump-
tions are made when natural selection is formulated as such?
On a meta-level, evolution by means of natural selection, as
defined by Neodarwinians, implies the following:
• Natural selection is always active: there is always a
scarcity of resources which results in a constant
struggle and a constant favouring of the fit over the
unfit, and species, therefore, also constantly evolve by
means of natural selection;
• Natural selection occurs slowly and gradually (at a
constant rate): mutations are chance events, and the
possible selection and transmission of adaptive muta-
tions are confined to the germ line and always require
the emergence of a new generation, making evolution a
timely event;
• Because of the requirement of germ line transmission
of novel traits, the origin of new species occurs as a
vertical process: species either evolve themselves out of
existence by evolving into new ones (anagenesis); or
they split off from older species (cladogenesis);
• Natural selection occurs at the interface of a phenotype
and the environment: in other words, the phenotype is
the unit of selection, and evolution by means of natural
selection occurs at the level of the environment.
Today, advances in the study of evolution have called
many of the above made assumptions into question. The
following criticisms can be objected:
(1) Because genes are the stuff that organisms and
ultimately evolution is built upon, population genetics
and later molecular genetics have been dominating all
theorizing on how evolution by means of natural
selection occurs. The exclusive focus on the distri-
bution of genetic traits has resulted in the idea that
microevolution (small random genetic changes) suf-
fices to explain macroevolution (the evolution of
species). This gene and mutation-centred idea has
been put forward to the neglect of the role of the
organism, the environment and species.
(2) Darwin had already recognized that besides adaptive
and maladaptive traits, organisms can display neutral
traits that appear to have no use in the struggle for
existence. He recognized the existence of such neutral
traits as a major challenge to his theory. How could
these neutral traits have evolved when selection was
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constantly active? The only answer could be that
sometimes selective pressures are loosened and no
struggle for existence occurs. Interested in how traits
originate and how they migrate within and across
populations (how they are distributed over space and
time), population geneticists came to realize that not
all traits are selected and spread as a consequence of
their adaptive values. Genetic drift theory and neutral
evolution, first introduced by Wright (1932) and later
elaborated upon by Kimura (1968, 1983), explain
how the transmission of traits from parents to
offspring is mostly the result of random sampling
and thus of stochastic processes. Because causation
can be attributed to genetic drift, we can call it an
evolutionary mechanism just as natural selection is
one. And the recognition that several evolutionary
mechanisms can be active, requires that we investi-
gate how these mechanisms alternate one another. A
further major consequence of the theory of genetic
drift is that evolution is not necessarily characterized
by an increase in fit between an organism and its
environment, and that consequently, evolution is not
necessarily progressive.
(3) When selection pressures are strengthened or loos-
ened, this can tamper with the rate of evolution. It
follows that the evolutionary rate, although perhaps
gradual, is not constant. The idea of gradualness
implies that intermediates need to be found between
species. As Darwin already noted, the fossil record
often does not show the remains of such intermediates
between different species. The fossil record has,
therefore, been called incomplete, and the field of
palaeontology has been considered useless in helping
to prove evolution. Eldredge and Gould (1972)
however argued that the gaps in the fossil record
need to be taken at face value. That is, the gaps are
real and they provide us with an empirical observa-
tion that can tell us something about evolution. The
authors introduced the theory of punctuated equilibria
to explain the rapid occurrence of new species in the
fossil record without the apparent presence of inter-
mediates. According to the theory of punctuated
equilibria, evolution is characterized by long periods
of stasis wherein no permanent evolutionary changes
occur, which are punctuated by short periods of rapid
change. During these long periods of stasis, new
variations can occur (due to random mutations), but
drift and the size of a population often make it
impossible for these novelties to become fixed. In
other word, even when there is variation over long
periods of time, speciation will not automatically
occur. Microevolutionary processes such as genetic
mutations, taken on their own, are incomplete to
explain the origin of new species (macroevolution).
Rather, the theory of punctuated equilibria suggests
that additional explanations need to be sought to
explain how speciation occurs. One of these addi-
tional explanations is the role of the physical envi-
ronment. Climate changes or natural barriers between
populations (allopatric speciation) can facilitate if not
induce speciation. This in turn has strong conse-
quences for how we understand species and the
process of speciation, because punctuated equilibria
suggests that species are real entities and speciation
events are real as well.
(4) Zooming in on the role of the environment, we can
argue that for a long time, the study of the environ-
ment was only relevant in so far as it gave the scene
where selection and speciation can occur. The
environment was considered to be of a purely
physical nature, and to be external to the organism.
Systems theory and ecological thinking would undo
of this assumption by arguing that the environment of
an organism is by and large made up of other
organisms (Van Valen 1973). Lewontin (2000) would
argue that organisms can, to a greater or lesser extent,
construct their own environment through a process
called niche construction. And organisms can change
their phenotypes in relation to a changing environ-
ment, a process that is called phenotypic plasticity by
West-Eberhard (2003). These theories have signifi-
cantly blurred the once distinctive barrier between
organism and environment.
Epigeneticists and evolutionary developmental biol-
ogists (evo–devo) brought to light that the internal
milieu of an organism, and non-genetic factors, are
highly relevant for the origin and evolution of species
(Goodman and Coughlin 2000). During the formation
of the Modern Synthesis, a firm line was drawn
between ontogeny, the development of the individual
from conception until death; phylogeny, the evolution
of species; and the external environment, the place
where evolution occurred. Today, scientists undo of
all these boundaries. Notions of eco–devo or ecolog-
ical developmental biology (Gilbert 2001), and even
eco–evo–devo are introduced from within a systems
theoretical perspective. Evolution is understood as a
hierarchical process, it occurs at several levels of
biological organisation. These organisational levels
are determined by both upward and downward
causation (Campbell 1974): the parts determine the
whole, but the whole also determines the parts in new
ways. Biological systems are probably unique in
portraying emergent properties.
(5) The adaptive status of a trait is not fixed, rather it
can change. Dependent on environmental changes,
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adaptive traits can become maladaptive, or neutral
traits can become adaptive. The function of a trait is
not constant either, since the function of a trait can be
put to use in a rather different context than the context
in which it evolved; or a non-functional trait can
require a function in the course of evolution. The
latter are the processes identified as co-optation and
exaptation by Gould and Vrba (1982).
(6) The requirement of germ line transmission of novel
traits, together with the resulting emphasis on evolu-
tion being vertical, has resulted in the neglect of
hybridization, lateral or horizontal gene transfer and
symbiogenesis as possible evolutionary mechanisms.
Nonetheless, we now know that the latter are indeed
mechanisms that can introduce novel traits, and that
can even lead to the origin of new species. Symbi-
ogenesis, as an evolutionary mechanism, was first
brought to the attention by Constantin Merezhkowsky
(1910), and it was later independently rediscovered
by Wallin (1927) and Margulis (1970, 1998). It is
now widely recognized that the cell organelles
present in eukaryotic organisms evolved out of the
merging of nucleated cells with different prokaryotes.
Margulis further argues that the first nucleated cells
also originated as the result of the merging of
different prokaryotes. In fact, the field of symbiogen-
esis today is a fast rising one, with implementations
reaching as far as botany, insectology, virology and
zoology (Sapp 2003). It now becomes abundantly
clear that every organism alive today is the result of
symbiogenetic mergers; it undergoes lateral gene
transfer through contact with parasites, or through
bacterial or viral infections; and it lives, to a great or
lesser extent, in symbiosis with other creatures.
(7) All of the above has resulted in major theoretical re-
conceptualisations of evolutionary terminology. What
is an ‘organism’, ‘species’, ‘environment’, and ‘evo-
lutionary mechanism’?
Organisms used to be regarded as homogeneous (even
sterile), well-demarcated, passive entities that evolved
as a whole, in an ever-changing environment that
actively selects the adaptive ones. Organisms were
unable to change their evolutionary faith. Today, we
know that organisms can, to some extent, actively
construct both their external environment (via niche
construction), as well as internal environment (through
immunological processes that allow or block parasites
to enter, and that allow to create conditions that are
different from the external milieu). Symbiogenetic
studies have further made it necessary to consider most
if not all organisms as superorganisms, because
organisms have a heterogeneous nature: they are made
up of different organisms with which they function as
an emerging whole. A crucial question then becomes
how these different structures are able to combine and
function as a whole.
The species concept has also been the subject of
serious reconsideration. Adhering to natural selection
and acknowledging that it is a gradual and automatic
process where intermediates successively follow one
after the other, necessitates that one understands
‘species’ as unreal, theoretical constructs that merely
facilitate theory-formation. Microevolutionary events
occur incessantly and as a consequence populations
constantly change. Species are not fixed entities.
Indeed, Darwin himself adhered to a nominological
species concept, arguing that species’ boundaries are
arbitrarily drawn by us humans, because species are
non-existent. A consequence of punctuated equilibria
and its introduction of macroevolutionary processes is
that species are considered real entities that have clear
spatial and temporal boundaries. Mayr’s (1942) bio-
logical species concept, the concept most associated
with the Modern Synthesis, takes the possibility to
hybridize and produce fertile offspring as prime
criteria to belong to the same species. The symbioge-
netic species concept as defined by Margulis and
Sagan (2002, p. 94), on the other hand, takes the
possibility of lineage crossing as an identifying criteria
of different species. Moreover, symbiogenesis implies
that just like organisms, species too are not homoge-
nous entities, but rather are formed through the
interaction of different species, if not altogether
through the incorporation of different gene sets and
whole organisms (such as microbes). Finally, the
acknowledgement of the existence of species makes it
necessary to ask whether species themselves are units
of evolution.
The environmental concept has also undergone sig-
nificant changes through time. Focus has shifted from
understanding the environment as a monolithic whole,
to recognizing the heterogeneous nature and multi-
layeredness of the environment. An environment is
dividable into many different habitats, and an envi-
ronment can include physical forces such as climate
change or gravitational forces, and biological elements
such as other organisms. The internal milieu of an
organism also creates an environment that can be the
scene of evolution. As the quintessential location of
where evolution by means of natural selection occurs,
the environment is the major level of evolution.
Recognizing the heterogeneous nature of the environ-
ment has, therefore, implied recognizing multilevel
evolution.
Finally, the nature of an evolutionary mechanism has
been subject to revision. Natural selection has been
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criticized by physicists for its lack of predictive value.
They state that selection cannot provide us with a law
of nature. The recognition of different mechanisms has
made us realize that mechanisms are not constant
forces like physical forces appear to be. Rather, their
workings are dependent on a series of conditions. We
need to identify those conditions. Mechanisms also not
merely provide us with a mode of evolution, they also
have consequences for theories on evolutionary rates,
and the recognition of different mechanisms has made
us contemplate the nature of their interaction: how do
different mechanisms work together? Or do they
alternate one another? These are just a few of the
major questions in need of an answer.
(8) Finally, since the introduction of natural selection, the
application range of evolutionary theory has widened
immensely. As a consequence, the following research
questions have been raised. What entities can evolve?
Where does this evolution occur? How does it occur?
Answers to these questions have been sought in the
units and levels of selection debate. Today, however,
we search not only for the units and levels of
selection. We also search for the units, levels and
underlying mechanisms of all sorts of evolution (the
evolution of life, the brain, culture, …). Darwin saw
evolution as something that occurs primarily through
natural selection, and this selection occurred at the
interface between an organism and an environment.
Dawkins (1976, 1982) argued that organisms are
mere vehicles. The true units of evolution were the
genes. Many evolutionary biologists and philosophers
of science have further argued that these genes can be
selected at many levels.
One of the consequences of acknowledging evolution
as a fact of nature has been that everything in the
organic world can only be the result of some kind of
evolutionary process. Recognizing the heterogeneous
nature of an individual implies that several parts of
the individual can evolve faster or slower and by
means of different evolutionary mechanisms. In other
words, the organism is a unit of evolution itself
decomposable into subunits that are also subjected to
evolution. This calls out for the recognition of
multiple units of evolution. Recognizing the hetero-
geneous nature of the environment implies that
multilevel selection (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry
1995; Okasha 2005) can occur. Recognizing the
heterogeneous nature of evolutionary mechanisms
again implies that multilevel evolution (rather than
merely selection) can occur and that even multi-
mechanism evolution can occur: evolution occurs
through a combination of different mechanisms
(Gontier, this volume).
This has widely expanded the range of natural
selection and evolutionary thought. Evolutionary
thinking is not merely relevant for biology, or for
understanding the evolution of organisms. Group-
level behaviours such as culture, or products of
biological organisms such as cognition or epistemol-
ogy, are now considered to be the outcome of
evolution. Therefore, they must be explainable by
the mechanisms of evolution. Evolutionary biology
today is expanded to include evolutionary psychol-
ogy, evolutionary epistemology, evolutionary anthro-
pology, archaeology, economics, etc.
In conclusion, the concept of evolution has itself
evolved. The above, however, should not be read as a
rejection of either Darwin’s or Neodarwinian thinking. If
anything, it demonstrates Darwin’s genius, for the past
150 years of evolutionary thinking have revolved around
how exactly we are to interpret the evolutionary concepts
first introduced by him. Although evolution might occur
faster than Darwin predicted, he first made us recognize
that evolution occurred tout court. Vertical evolution, for
example, might need to be complemented by horizontal
evolutionary mechanisms, but it is only by recognizing
such a thing as vertical evolution to begin with that we
have come to identify horizontal evolution as another
possibility. Through the recognition of microevolutionary
events, we were able to distinguish macroevolutionary
events, and we can now begin the search for its underlying
mechanisms.
The complexification of evolution
The above makes it obvious that evolutionary studies
nowadays are characterized by a severe complexification of
research questions. Many new disciplines have evolved,
which developed new techniques to observe, test and the-
orize on the evolution of life. The different contributions
that make up these volumes zoom in on some of the most
pertinent research questions. A brief summary of the arti-
cles follows.
Part A examines natural selection, drift, punctuated
equilibria and symbiogenesis from a historical, scientific
and philosophical perspective.
Special attention is given to the different species con-
cepts that are associated with these mechanisms.
The first two articles of Part A present a short historical
review of microevolutionary experiments conducted on
fruit flies, followed by the results of a 20-year-long and
ongoing domestication experiment with Drosophila
subobscura. Darwin was oblique on how novel and existing
variation originated and how it was hereditarily transmitted.
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The introduction of Weismann’s germ plasm theory toge-
ther with Weismann’s barrier, the rediscovery of Mendelian
genetic laws, the development of the chromosome and gene
theory, the adherence to de Vries’ mutation theory, and the
cracking of the genetic code in the fifties of the previous
century, have all contributed to the development of the field
of population and molecular biology. Molecular biology is
by far the most appropriate field by which we can study
microevolutionary events and it is also in this biological
domain that questions centre around what the ultimate role
is that can be attributed to natural selection and drift. Many
of the formulated hypotheses can be tested experimentally,
especially on organisms such as fruit flies, because they
have a very short life cycle which enables scientists to have
a quick insight into how variation evolves across multiple
generations.
Margarida Matos begins by lining out the pros and cons
of lab-based experimental evolution and explains how the
field can lend insight into real-time evolutionary events.
Thereafter, she reviews how experimental studies with
Drosophila melanogaster were conducted to test the role
different habitats can play in sympatric speciation. Such
experiments make it clear that habitat selection can result
in reproductive isolation which in turn enhances genetic
divergence and thus it can ultimately lead to sympatric
speciation. Matos goes on and examines experiments
conducted on the same fruit flies to investigate the process
of ageing. The evolutionary theory of ageing states that the
strength natural selection has on an organism declines with
age, and thus that natural selection is not uniformly active
on the organism during its different life phases. Such a
hypothesis can be tested by reversing evolution. Scientists
have created experimental settings wherein later age cycles
of Drosophila melanogaster were preferred, and this
resulted in a decline of the rate by which these organisms
aged.
Marta Santos and co-workers zoom in on 20-year-long
domestication experiments conducted on Drosophila su-
bobscura. These experiments investigate just what it means
for an organism to become adapted to a new environment,
and how organisms adapt to captivity in general. More
specifically, natural populations of these species of fruit
flies were domesticated in the lab and it was investigated
how well they adapted to their new surroundings under
captivity. The results obtained from these studies univo-
cally report that when placed in a new environment, the
selection pressure is high and the evolutionary rate by
which characters change is faster. This rate subsequently
declines, a tendency that is echoed in molecular analyses of
microsatellites. After foundation, a slow temporal decrease
in genetic diversity can be witnessed. Also, a loss in
chromosomal polymorphisms in the long-established
populations of fruit flies is distinguished. The studies
demonstrate that the experimentally induced, real-time
evolution of fruit flies happens through a fine balancing
between natural selection and genetic drift in relation to
population size. It concludes that adaptive evolution is a
local event.
A basic tenet of the Modern Synthesis has been that
these microevolutionary events are sufficient to explain
macroevolution. Small random genetic mutations will
gradually lead to the diversification of populations and,
over generations, this will lead to speciation. Evolutionary
change is constant and evolution by means of natural
selection becomes inevitable. Punctuated equilibria argues
that macroevolution, i.e. speciation, needs to be distin-
guished from microevolution and that the latter, taken on
its own is insufficient to explain speciation events. Change
is punctuated by periods of stasis. Stasis, i.e. no change,
becomes problematic and in need of scientific explanation.
Two articles investigate the relation between gradualism
and punctuated equilibria.
For a long time, punctuated equilibria has been associ-
ated with the fossil record and with the field of palaeon-
tology. However, nowadays, due to large-scale genome-
sequencing programs of whole species, molecular evolu-
tion can also be put to use to examine the basic assump-
tions of punctuated equilibria in a neontological context.
The article of Melanie Monroe and Folmer Bokma does
exactly that. The authors investigate how genomic
sequences of whole clades allow to test the assumptions
that long-term periods of stasis are alternated by short
periods of rapid change during speciation. Several mech-
anisms have been put forward to explain the phenomenon
of stasis. Monroe and Bokma review the following: sta-
bilising selection, organismal plasticity, rapid adaptation
and hyperstable niches, niche or habitat tracking, and the
impossibility for new variations to become established into
new species. Through their analysis, they demonstrate how
the study of stasis brings forth a whole new set of research
questions previously unrecognized as such by the founders
of the Modern Synthesis. The authors focus on their own
study which revolves around mammal and bird phylogeny
to demonstrate that evolution can be concentrated in spe-
ciation events rather than that it occurs gradually through
time. Moreover, during speciation, lineages accumulate
variance at a higher rate; thus, during speciation there is an
acceleration of the evolutionary rate.
A consequence of punctuated equilibria is that both
species and speciation events are considered real phe-
nomena in nature. Derek Turner takes a philosophical
approach and investigates what else is suggested by the
theory of punctuated equilibria. He argues that punctuated
equilibria suggests, but does not imply, that species
selection occurs. One of the epistemological questions that,
therefore, need to be looked into is the following: when a
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theory A suggests a theory B, does this provide proof for
theory B? Does this imply that theory B is correct? In other
words, does the fact that punctuated equilibria suggest that
there is such a thing as species selection, also provide proof
that species selection occurs? His answer is negative,
because according to Turner, punctuated equilibria con-
cerns the pace of evolution, while species selection con-
cerns the mode of evolution. Nonetheless, this does not rule
out that species selection cannot occur. As a theory, species
selection is merely distinguishable from punctuated equi-
libria. The author goes on to investigate how other theories
have suggested species selection as well.
The following two articles are on symbiogenesis.
Symbiogenesis was first recognized to be an evolutionary
mechanism by Merezhkowsky (Sapp et al. 2002). Unfor-
tunately, this mechanism has long been neglected by the
mainstream biological community, partly due to the suc-
cess of selectionist approaches. Nonetheless, it is now a
well-established fact that evolution by symbiogenesis
occurs, and that it occurs quite differently from the way in
which evolution by means of natural selection proceeds.
Symbiogenesis leads to speciation, and this speciation
occurs rapidly. This is the major conclusion Jan Sapp
comes to after reviewing the historical origin and scientific
insights of symbiotic studies. Symbiosis was first brought
to the attention by de Bary, who argued that it could be a
mode of saltational change. However, historically, symbi-
osis has often been examined in relation to parasitism,
commensalism and mutualism. More often than not it has
been conflated with either one of the latter. The concept of
symbiosis indeed has severe consequences for how we
understand organisms and species. Its recognition intro-
duces concepts such as ‘symbiotic superorganisms’ or
‘interspecies supraorganisms’. New wholes are made up of
different parts that function in integrative ways which lead
to novel properties and functions. With Merezhkowsky,
symbiogenesis finally became recognized as an evolution-
ary mechanism. Wallin would go so far as to argue that
evolutionary novelty is introduced by symbiogenesis, while
natural selection results in the preservation or weeding out
of that novelty. This idea was reinforced by Margulis when
she demonstrated the symbiotic origin of eukaryotic
organelles. Today, we know that symbiogenesis can be
hereditary, as is shown by cases such as Wolbachia. Sapp,
therefore, concludes that the tree of life is highly reticu-
lated and symbiogenesis as well as horizontal gene transfer
should be treated with the same amount of attention that is
bestowed on natural selection.
Francisco Carrapiço homes in on the evolutionary and
epistemological consequences of a symbiogenetic evolu-
tionary view. Symbiosis and horizontal gene transfer
between species can lead to rapid speciation as well as rapid
adaptation to the environment. He further provides us with
insights on the mechanism of hereditary symbiosis based on
his own research of Azolla. Azolla is a fern that floats on the
surface of fresh-water environments. The leaf cavities of
Azolla hosts a whole community of different prokaryotes
that help the fern to survive and prosper. Carrapiço argues
that Azolla can be understood as a superorganism, and the
leaf cavity as a unit of this symbiotic association. The
symbiotic interaction allows the superorganism to establish
a new level of organisation that extends beyond the
capacities that the individual parts have.
A comparison of natural selection to punctuated equi-
libria and symbiogenesis makes the following questions
quite pertinent: What is a species and how do species
originate? Two articles zoom in on species concepts.
John Wilkins provides us with a historical and philo-
sophical analyses of the species concept debate. He traces
the word all the way back to Aristotle. Nowadays, it is a
commonly held assumption that with the introduction of
Darwin’s Origin of species, natural scientists first aban-
doned the idea that species are real, that they have fixed
essences and that they carry essential properties. However,
Wilkins demonstrates that this idea of species’ essences has
never really been endorsed either by Aristotle himself or by
naturalists that preceded Darwin. He traces this ‘essentialist
story’ back to an article that was written by John Dewey.
Wilkins argues instead that naturalists, before and after
Darwin, have endorsed, what he calls, a generative con-
ception of species. Species have the characterisation of
generativity: progeny resemble parents, the like bring forth
the like.
Filipe Costa and Gary Carvalho explain how the recent
bar-coding initiative of life provides us with a different,
pragmatic way of identifying species. At present, different
labs all over the world are in the process of sequencing the
same, pre-defined fragment of DNA that is present in a
mitochondrial gene of all animals, and they are examining
a different ‘barcode’ for plants and fungi. This ‘barcode’
can subsequently be used to identify and classify species,
and it can also provide us with some comparative insights
on the evolution of eukaryotic beings. For one, the barcode
initiative allows for a fast identification of cryptic (sibling)
species and can, therefore, help form hypothesis of the
nature of morphological stasis in related species. It further
allows to draw conclusions on the patterns of molecular
divergence and the rate of nucleotide substitution.
The acknowledgement that species are real entities has
not only given way to the formulation of different species
concepts, it has additionally introduced the possibility that
species might be units of selection in their own right. Two
articles analyse the units and levels of evolution debate.
A conceptual analysis of what it means for something to
be a species or a unit of selection is provided by André
Levy. Different species concepts ultimately provide us with
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different ways to draw the tree of life. Levy reviews the
different systematic ways to draw phylogenies. Numeral
taxonomists preferred to highlight patterns of morpholog-
ical similarity, while cladists preferred to draw trees based
on phylogenetic relationships. Both endeavours got syn-
thesized by evolutionary systematics that combined mor-
phological similarity with evolutionary information.
Endosymbiogenesis additionally demonstrates that the tree
of life is highly reticulated. In the second part of the article,
Levy zooms in on the concept of ‘unit’ of selection. Tra-
ditionally, the unit of selection has been considered the
phenotype. Dawkins, however, argued that the unit of
selection is the gene, while the organism is a mere vehicle
that carries these genes. Genes are replicating entities, and
Dawkins thus argues that something can only be a unit of
selection when it is replicated. Other functional require-
ments have been given to units of selection, such as their
interacting capacities (Hull’s concept of an interactor). In
relation to the adaptation debate, a distinction has been
made between the manifestor and the beneficiary of the
adaptation.
Nathalie Gontier takes a more pragmatic approach to the
units and levels of evolution debate. The acknowledgement
of different evolutionary mechanisms, different evolution-
ary rates and different environmental settings has made us
realize that the whole of an organism does not evolve
simultaneously in a homogenous environment according to
one single constant evolutionary mechanism. Rather, dif-
ferent parts of the organism (e.g. its symbionts), or even
different parts of the genome, evolve according to different
mechanisms, and follow their own, often different pace of
evolution. Moreover, it is not always clear whether a cer-
tain feature, environment, event, etc. is either a unit or a
level of evolution; and nor is it clear under what circum-
stances an evolutionary mechanism becomes active or
ceases to be so. Given this multiplicity of evolutionary
mechanisms, and given that there are several units of
evolution and several levels where evolution can occur,
how can we identify these units, levels and mechanisms of
evolution? Gontier proposes to step away from metaphys-
ical and functional definitions of units, levels and mecha-
nisms of evolution and argues that one should identify units
based on levels and mechanisms; levels based on units and
mechanisms; and mechanisms based on units and levels.
Three heuristics are provided that allow for such a prag-
matic identification of units, levels and mechanisms of
evolution, and it is explained how evolutionary episte-
mology can investigate the conditions under which evolu-
tionary mechanisms occur.
Most of the molecular studies that are presently con-
ducted could not have been done without the help of the
computer. Part A, therefore, closes with a look into how
computation studies can advance biological investigations.
Luı́s Correia describes how evolutionary algorithms
allow for a firm testing of natural selection, especially in
regard to optimisation problems. In addition, studies on co-
evolution and symbiosis can be modelled and tested by
making use of computer simulations. Finally, attention is
given to advances made in the field of Artificial Life.
Today evolution is such a widely recognized fact that its
implications far outreach the field of biology. Human
evolution as well as behaviours displayed by human beings
can only be understood from within an evolutionary con-
text. Darwin (1871, 1872) already applied his ideas of
natural selection to human evolution in his books The
Descent of Man, and The expression of the emotions in man
and animals. Part B, therefore, zooms in on the application
of Neodarwinian thinking in the human and social sciences.
Ian Tattersall begins the volume with an outline of
hominid evolution and the difference between anatomical
and behavioural modernity. Modern behavioural features
such as tool making are already present in different hom-
inid species even though they are not anatomically modern
in the same way as human beings are. Moreover, a puzzle
brought forward by the archaeological record is that the
same tool technologies are often associated with different
hominid species. This demonstrates that cultural evolution
follows a different pace than the physical evolution of
hominids, and that cultural evolution is marked by a ten-
dency to resist change (stasis or tradition is thus a typical
feature of culture). Tattersall further argues that although
many innovative behaviours are shared with other hominid
species, humans have unique symbolic capabilities. As a
species, human beings reached anatomical modernity long
before they displayed signs of this modern symbolic
behaviour. An implication is that symbolic behaviour must
have evolved as an exaptation, and that symbolic behaviour
is an emergent property.
One major symbolic innovation that is associated with
our species is the capacity to have language. António
Bracinha Vieira examines how the different tool technol-
ogies associated with our hominid ancestors can provide us
with insights into the origin of language. He argues that the
use and the manufacture of tools requires cognitive
capacities that are similar to syntactic and lexical capaci-
ties. A co-evolution might have occurred between the
origin of tools and the origin of language. More specifi-
cally, the introduction of specific tool types such as
Oldowan pebble tools or Auchelean bifaces requires that
the manufacturer has a clear cognitive image in mind of the
tool that he is about to make, and this tool might have
received a name. The manufacture of complex tools
requires that one follows a series of well-defined behav-
ioural rules which are comparable to the syntactic rules that
allow us to structure words into sentences. Vieira further
provides us with neurological evidence that points in the
Theory Biosci. (2010) 129:77–87 85
123
direction of a co-evolution between tool making and lan-
guage. The long periods of stasis, wherein the same tool
types are made by different hominid species across geo-
graphically distinct regions, implies that the tool prototypes
were culturally transmitted and that there might have been
some type of cultural group selection process involved. He
argues that the origin of language far precedes our own
species, and that it might have evolved as an exaptation of
tool making capacities.
Another major symbolic innovation associated with our
species is art. Jan Verpooten and Mark Nelissen state that
the origin of art provides Neodarwinian views with a
challenge: the creation of art does not appear to provide its
maker with direct survival benefits and in so far as it does
not, the behaviour might even be considered maladaptive.
How then could it have evolved? The authors argue that art
evolved as an exaptation of biological adaptations. Human
beings, for example, have an inborn capacity to recognize
faces, a behaviour that is most likely an adaptation for it
helps children distinguish their caregivers from strangers.
The origin of portrait art and our fascination with it, might
have evolved as a side-effect of our biological capacity to
be attracted to faces. Art, in other words, exploits pre-
existing sensory sensitivities and can evolve as long as the
costs are not to heavy for the organism that bears them.
They obtain the concept of sensory exploitation from
sexual selection theory, a theory indeed first introduced by
Darwin in parallel to his idea of natural selection. The
origin of art also demonstrates the presence of cultural
evolution because the production of art requires the
learning of a series of skills. These cannot be re-invented
anew or acquired single-handedly during the life-time of a
individual. The authors remain undecided on whether art
itself can be considered an adaptation.
Besides understanding human evolution, and human
behaviour such as language and art, as the direct outcome
of the evolutionary process, we can also apply evolutionary
methods as epistemological tools that can be of use for
human and social sciences. The last two articles demon-
strate how this is the case in the field of linguistics and
political science.
In the Origin, Darwin already drew parallels between
the evolution of species and the evolution of languages.
Both were argued to evolve according to a selectionist
process. This resulted in a temporary cross-fertilisation
between the field of historical linguistics and evolutionary
biology. Remnants of this cross-fertilisation can still be
found in the use of phylogenetic trees by both linguists
and biologists to portray the evolution of languages and
species. James Steele and Anne Kandler investigate the
differences and similarities between trees that display the
genetic dispersal of humans and their languages, as well
as the virtues and vices of such macroevolutionary
comparisons. It is often assumed by such comparisons that
the genetic dispersal of human populations runs parallel
with the evolution of the languages these populations
speak. They focus on the shift from Gaelic to English in the
Scottish highlands. A shift occurred from the former to the
latter language, because the speakers shifted to a different
language. The demographic tree did not die out, it simply
transferred to another branch on the linguistic tree. This
example of language shift, therefore, is at odds with stan-
dard ideas that require there to be a congruence between
the biological and the cultural tree. They, therefore, argue
that language shifting requires additional cultural expla-
nations such as selective cultural migration (due to mar-
riage, trade, political integration, etc). Moreover, their
research shows that horizontal transmission process can
nonetheless be displayed as tree models.
The last article, written by Orion Lewis and Sven
Steinmo, investigates how evolutionary jargon can be
introduced in political sciences. When natural selection
was first introduced, it quickly gave way to notions such as
Hebert Spencer’s ‘survival of the fittest’, racism, eugenet-
ics, and developmental laws of culture. These ideas,
however, are not necessarily conclusions that need to be
drawn from the theory of evolution by means of natural
selection. Rather, racial ideas or ideas on eugenetics rely on
misinterpretations of the evolutionary process. These ideas
are thus both politically as well as biologically incorrect
and it is no-one’s wish to revitalize them. Nonetheless, just
as the evolution of cognition, tool manufacture, language
and culture can be regarded as an evolutionary process, so
can political history be regarded as an evolutionary pro-
cess. Indeed, accepting evolution as a fact of nature, and
accepting that all behaviour displayed by individuals is the
consequence of some kind of evolutionary process, makes
the line between mere history and evolution fuzzy, for what
is evolution more than a description of natural history (or
vice versa)? Lewis and Steinmo demonstrate how the field
of political science has been dominated by a reductionist
philosophy that has its roots in mechanical, Newtonian
physics and mathematical reductionism. This results in a
search for political laws and a growth of rational-choice
theory to explain political change. They argue that this
approach is at odds with how political history truly evolves,
and the authors plead for an introduction of evolutionary
ontology that can underlie the epistemological questions
framed in their field. Political systems, they argue, are
complex adaptive systems that are hierarchically structured
and that undergo evolution at multiple levels. Evolutionary
theory can further provide us with explanations of why
organisms display certain types of social behaviour such as
cooperation or altruism; why they form groups and social
institutions; why they have a tendency to obey social rules;
or where moral sentiments might come from.
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In conclusion, the past 150 years are marked by an
evolution of evolution. Evolution today forms part and
parcel of our everyday life and the consequences of an
evolutionary world view have only recently impregnated
all layers of scientific thinking. At present, it is unclear how
far an evolutionary approach will take us in solving the
problems considered in the human and social sciences. And
although natural selection is today accompanied by other
evolutionary mechanisms such as stasis or symbiogenesis,
many evolutionary mechanisms are probably still waiting
to be discovered. This is the case because accepting evo-
lution equals accepting that there is no such thing that came
into existence without evolution. Therefore if something
did not evolve by a known evolutionary mechanism such as
natural selection, drift or symbiogenesis, then it must have
evolved by another evolutionary mechanism. The full
consequences of an evolutionary view are, therefore, still to
be felt, and the legacy of Darwin continues.
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